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Intro: What is so special about French citizenship? 
 
Citizenship and national identities are central elements of political systems. 
They account for the political link, i.e. for the relationship between the 
citizens as well as between citizens and rulers. Citizenship is often analyzed 
through the notions of rights and obligations (Walzer 1989). As Jean Leca 
pointed out, these rights and obligations are not only a matter of status, of 
legal rules(Leca 1983). They also encompass a set of values or moral 
qualities as well as a series of social roles. The relationship between rules, 
values and roles is not straightforward. Civic values and the distinction 
between citizens’ and private roles are part of the political culture of a 
country. The legal regulation of membership, rights and obligations is also 
supposed to reflect this political culture, but it may be influenced by external 
sources of constraint, such as supranational integration.  
Moreover, a political culture is not an homogeneous set of values shared by 
all members of a political community. It is an evolving but persistent 
configuration of competing ideologies inherited from the main political 
struggles that the national community has gone through. The notion of 
national identity is embedded in the political culture. In the fullest sense of 
the term, a national identity is a complex pattern of meanings and values 
related to the group whose borders are defined by the state’s capacity to 
intervene. Any change in the regulation of the group may be interpreted as a 
consequence as well as a cause of some change in national identity. 
 
In the French case, political culture and national identity have long been 
described as very specific, in terms of republican ideology. Indeed, the 
notion of République, key notion of the republican ideology, is a rather odd 
one. The republican political community is basically conceived as a neutral 
sphere, where all citizens are considered equal, regardless of any difference 
such as gender, religious affiliation, ethnic and/or geographical origins, 
cultural preferences, etc. This abstract concept is a product of the 
Revolution. In seeking to break with the Ancien Regime, the French 
invented a universalistic model of citizenship, in which there is no corps 
intermédiaire (any intermediary body) between the citizen and his/her 
fellow, between him/her and the nation. This was achieved through the 
destruction of local and territorial representation and allegiance 
(Rosanvallon 1990), and by not recognizing dependant people as citizen 
                                                          
1 Many thanks to Kathy Bramble, Géraldine Bozec, Henriette Dahan-Kahlev, Florence 
Haegel and the editors of this volume for their comments and suggestions on the draft of 
this chapter. 
  2 
(Rosanvallon 1992). Accordingly, in the public sphere, the citizens are 
supposed to express their opinion and act in accordance with a general will. 
This general will is embodied in and implemented by the State, which leads 
them on the way to progress. In particular, the State is responsible for the 
schools where citizens will be educated in order to become competent, rise 
above their private interests and get involved in the French republican 
community. Anybody can enter the political community, as long as he/she 
accepts giving up his/her distinctive identities. By default, being born and 
raised on the soil of France is acknowledged as a sufficient condition to 
become a citizen. The French nation, considered as a common inheritance, 
gives its substance, colours and taste to this abstract political community. 
(Nicolet 1982)  
Despite an apparent coherence, the French concept of the citizen and the 
nation combines different traditions and has given rise to different facets of 
nationalism. (Hazareesingh 1994). Famous French discourses about the 
nation, from Renan to De Gaulle, are the result of a compromise between 
competing ideologies, mainly the Catholic and the republican ones, which 
have struggled for dominance for more than a century in French political 
culture. Before the Revolution, France was a complete catholic country, 
Catholicism referring not only to religious belief, but also very much to a 
Church, to a supranational hierarchical source of power. France was well 
known as the “eldest daughter of the Church”. By the Revolution, the fight 
against Catholicism had at least two very different objectives: ensuring 
pluralism of religion in the sense of giving some space and recognition for 
others, especially Jews and Protestants, to practise their faith and moreover, 
gaining the freedom of conscience, the liberation of mind or will of French 
people from any religious power (Baudérot 2000). The fight against the 
Catholic Church and the attempt to eradicate the Catholic Church’s 
domination is a very long story (Rémond 1985), with lots of twists and 
turns, from the civil constitution of the clergy in 1790 to the separation of 
Church and State in 1905, via the Concordat from 1801. The education 
system, particularly primary and then secondary schools, was the main 
battlefield (Déloye 1994). Because  in the early years of the Third Republic, 
the education system was completely dominated by the Catholic church, the 
republican government considered that the Republic could not be 
established without the setting up of a public, free, compulsory and laic 
primary schooling where all citizens would be educated, taught republican 
values and be free from any kind of domination of their thoughts. Indeed 
Laïcité, whose direct translation “laicity” does not make much sense, is not a 
plain equivalent for secularism. More than referring to the temporal 
dimension of life, by contrast with a spiritual or religious dimension of it, it 
refers to the independence of the temporal from the religious.  
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The current and familiar figure of the French citizen is the product of this 
long battle between, mainly, Republicans and Catholics. Despite the efforts 
of preeminent intellectuals to give this concept of French citizenship a 
rational and consistent shape (Schnapper 1994), French citizens have 
actually inherited mixed beliefs about who they are and what their nation 
should be. Being a combination of meanings and values from different 
ideologies is not specific to the French national identity, nor does it mean 
that it is particularly fragile. But this special mixture of republicanism and 
Catholicism (plus others minor influences) gave rise to a tension between 
the desire for universalism and a need for a distinctive identity that is 
particularly acute in the French case. People do feel at the same time 
members of a distinctive united community and universal individuals 
responsible for humanity. They often feel themselves to be uneasy about 
fulfilling the contradictory requirements of these different ways of feeling 
about oneself (Duchesne 1997). This results in significant difficulty to 
understand pluralism, a tendency to confuse equality and uniformity and to 
suspect any claim to difference of being a step towards communitarianism – 
and hence towards the breaking of the national cohesion.  
Thus, contrary to what it may appear from political discourse, where the 
myth of republican citizenship (Cole 1998) is strongly and regularly 
reasserted, it is really the mix of republican and Catholic traditions and the 
resulting tensions that are specific to French national identity.  
How does such a complex balance between originally antagonistic concepts 
of membership of the political community react to the rapid transformation 
of the French political system caused by the growing mobility of people, the 
increasing interdependence of governments, the supranational integration of 
political communities, the fast expansion of worldwide communication 
systems and mass culture - in short, all the processes encompassed by the 
notion of globalization? The question is too difficult to be answered as such. 
Instead, this chapter will deal with four questions, related to nature of the 
political community, that have been subject to a change of regulation in the 
last decade. For each of them, we will try to assess if these changes seem to 
indicate a corresponding change in the configuration of French 
representations of citizenship. We will first consider the nationality laws 
which, in the French system where citizenship and nationality are almost 
equivalent, play an important role in the definition of the political 
community. We will see how all arguments, for and against the declaration 
of will introduced in 1993, refer to republican principles showing the 
permanent need to reinvent a consensus on the very nature of French 
national community. Secondly, we will examine the decision on parity and 
discuss the reality of a change in the French blindness to differences. Then 
we will turn to European integration and the multi-level democracy in 
progress that France seems to be becoming. We will observe that if 
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something is changing here, this is less the very nature of the national 
identity than the uneasiness of French people with the pluralism of power. 
Lastly, we will have a longer discussion of a quite incredible headscarf 
affair. The ferocity of this debate, that has lasted for a decade now, does not 
make sense unless you know that laicity at school is the most sensitive scar 
left by the battle between Republicans and Catholics at the core of French 
political culture.  
 
The return of the jus soli 
In 1993, in a context of strong political controversy, a law on French 
nationality was adopted introducing a further requirement for people to 
become French, the “declaration of will”. This rule was first suggested in 
1986 by the Chirac government: a young person born in France of foreign 
parents would not automatically be French on becoming 18 but would have 
to express his/her will to become French. This proposal gave rise to a hotly 
contested debate. The government reconsidered and gave a special 
committee, chaired by Marceau Long, the task of examining possible ways 
to reform the legislation on nationality. By this time, the system had become 
quite complicated. The committee interviewed many people and wrote a 
report “Being French today and tomorrow” (Commission de la nationalité 
1988). With the re-election of François Mitterrand and the forming of the 
Rocard government, nothing happened. But when the right came back to 
power in 1993, they made their intention to legislate on immigration very 
clear. Charles Pasqua, the Interior Minister, gave his name to a law on the 
conditions of entering and living in France for foreigners and Pierre 
Méhaignerie, the Justice Minister, gave his to the reform of nationality laws. 
This proposal was officially inspired by the Marceau Long report, which 
was quite consensual. Most people declaring themselves as Republican first 
found that the “declaration of will” suited the republican idea of the nation, 
as famously expressed in Renan’s 1882 conference “What is a nation?” 
(Renan 1992). But in 1993 the law was explicitly meant to satisfy the right 
wing electorate, whose expectations on the matter had been raised by the 
influence of the National Front. The left parties were then committed to 
change them as soon as they came back into power. Indeed, the reform of 
the Mehaignerie laws was mentioned by Lionel Jospin in his investiture 
declaration in 1997. The new socialist government asked Patrick Weil, a 
socialist political scientist, to establish another report explicitly on the 
application of jus soli (Le Monde, 1
st
 of August 1997). A preliminary 
analysis of the consequences of the application of the declaration of will 
showed that the young people did not reject it at all, as it had sometimes 
been argued. On the contrary: in 1994, 33 255 young people became French 
after having expressed their will, and 30526 in 1995, in comparison with a 
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mean of 23000 eighteen year old who became automatically French in 
previous years (the increase being a mechanical result of the change in the 
range of age, from 16 to 21 years, provided by the law). A closer scrutiny 
revealed some problems, especially in the examination of rejected cases. 
There were differences in the treatment of applications according to the 
location, gender and geographical origin of the young people. Moreover, it 
appeared that some young people were not really aware of the fact that they 
had to express their will, and others, especially young women, could even be 
prevented by their family from applying. Nevertheless, the assessment was 
not all negative. 
Elisabeth Guigou, the new Justice Minister, presented a reform plan while 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of the Interior, introduced a new law on 
immigration (see Guiraudon’s chapter in this book). The debate was fierce 
amongst the left, as the government did not choose to reintroduce an 
“integral” jus soli, which would have meant that a child of foreign parents 
born in France is French from his/her birth. Nor did they decide to return to 
the former arrangement, where the parents could apply on behalf of children 
under eighteen. In the first proposal, the jus soli was to apply only at 
eighteen. The opposition was fierce within the right wing parties, too. They 
had the majority in Senate, and even voted for an amendment providing for 
a referendum on the subject. Finally, the new measures are the following. A 
young person born in France of foreign parents is French when he/she is 
eighteen, if he/she has lived in France for five years in total since the age of 
eleven. He/she can anticipate the recognition by the State of his/her quality 
of Frenchness and express his/her will to become French from the age of 
thirteen (with his/her parents’ consent between thirteen and sixteen). Or 
he/she can turn it down from six months before being eighteen and during 
one year afterward.  
Should this return of the jus soli be interpreted as a new episode in 
Brubaker’s point, namely as the way nationality laws epitomize a concept of 
the nation? In an often quoted book, based on a French-German comparison, 
Rogers Brubaker argued that the jus soli embodies a civic notion of the 
nation, open to newcomers, while jus sanguinis, characterises an idea of the 
nation based on ethnicity (Brubaker 1992). This demonstration has been 
contested recently (Weil 2002). First, jus soli cannot be considered as a 
French republican feature: it has been part of French law since only 1889. 
After the Revolution, French legislators chose the jus sanguinis as as way to 
break with the allegiance to the Ancien Regime that used to be implemented 
through the jus soli. Moreover, the idea that nationality laws epitomize one 
country’s idea of the nation is debatable. According to Weil, jus soli is not 
the mark of civic nations but the rules adopted by countries that have come 
to consider themselves as countries of immigration. Nowadays, in the 
European Union, far from diverging from one another according to 
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contrasting ideas of the nation, nationality laws tend to converge according 
to a common experience of massive post-war immigration (Hansen & Weil 
2001). 
This demonstration contradicts most beliefs expressed in France in the last 
decade, where jus soli is generally considered as a republican principle. It is 
symptomatic that a right-wing government, even in its attempt to satisfy the 
far right-wing electorate, has not even tried to suppress the jus soli. The 
declaration of will has been interpreted by their opponents as reintroducing a 
sort of requirement of allegiance for children of foreign origin. Moreover, it 
has been considered at odds with the principle of equality. During the Third 
Republic, republicans fought against Catholics to impose the idea of the 
citizen as a person who  has been educated according to certain values and 
principles. The second generation that was required to declare the will to 
become French has been socialised in French schools and hence, educated as 
French citizens. The national identity which in contemporary France 
encompasses jus soli as one of its devices is not a set of consensual beliefs. 
The French obsession with nationality laws (Favell 2001) accounts for the 
persistent questioning amongst French people about the very nature of their 
political community. 
 
The law on parity: a breach in French universalism. 
Voting became really universal – meaning for men and women – in France 
after the Second World War. Forty years later, French women were always a 
tiny minority in all elected Assemblies – less than 10% in the National 
Assembly until 1997, amongst the smallest proportion in the EU. Indeed, 
universalism has long been in the way of French feminists. First, because the 
feminist movement itself has been fiercely divided along this line, between 
supporters of the recognition of differences between men and women as a 
fundamental characteristic of human nature, and promoters of pure equality 
between them. Then secondly because the left-wing parties, which in other 
countries have been the best allies of feminist claims, were in France the 
more universalist, and hence, the more likely to reject any demand for 
specific treatment for women (Duchen 1986). The disconnection between 
gender differences and inequality of women claimed by Anglo-Saxon 
feminists (Young 1990) is far from achieved amongst French intellectual 
women. Thirdly, for a very long time, public opinion itself resisted the idea 
of treating men and women differently, because of the strength of 
universalism in French political culture. The notion of affirmative action has 
never won support in this context. The idea of giving any advantage to 
anyone because of what he/she is, even with the argument that because of 
what he/she is, his/her opportunities in life are lessened, is very difficult to 
justify for a French audience. Affirmative action definitively bears a notion 
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of unfairness that is made obvious by its (not very accurate) translation as 
“discrimination positive” (litt. positive discrimination) (Calvès 1999) In 
1982, the National Assembly, that had recently acquired a Socialist majority, 
adopted a proposal of law that prohibited any list for city council elections 
which had 75% of more candidates of the same gender. Even this very light 
formulation, the Constitutional Council interpreted it as introducing a quota 
of reserved places for women. “All citizens being equal before it [the law], 
are equally admissible to all public offices, positions, and employments, 
according to their capacity, and without other distinction than that of virtues 
and talents.” (article 6 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen of 1797) The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen being 
part of the Constitution, the project was declared unconstitutional.  
As a consequence of this defeat, the claim to a better representation of 
women in the political sphere has been reformulated differently, as the so 
called parité (parity). Instead of quotas or any kind of affirmative action, 
feminist supporters of the recognition of gender difference have done their 
best to change the debate. Within a decade of mobilisation, and with the 
support, or even the encouragement of the Council of Europe, they have 
succeeded in framing the claim of equal representation through the quest for 
more democracy. Instead of focussing on the quest for equality, they have 
argued that women would act differently from men if they had the power, 
and denounced the very low proportion of women in ruling positions as a 
consequence of a deliberate attitude of male politicians (Mossuz-Lavau 
1998). A high point of the parity movement was the publication in the 
newspaper Le Monde of a “Manifesto of the 577 for parity democracy” 
(Manifeste des 577 pour une démocratie paritaire – 577 being the number 
of seats in the National Assembly) signed by 289 women and 288 men, 
belonging to left and right parties. Parity did not win the support of all the 
feminist movement; for a hint on the persistent reluctance of some of them, 
contrast for instance (Pisier 2001) and (Baudino 2003). 
But parity won greater support out of feminist circles and became one of the 
issues at stake for the 1995 presidential campaign. In October 1995, the new 
right-wing government set up an a committee to observe the evolution of 
parity between men and women (Observatoire de la parité entre les hommes 
et les femmes), which played an important role both in documenting the gap 
between men and women in ruling positions and as a resource, an arena for 
the supporters of parity. Alain Juppé did not respond very positively to the 
propositions made in the report that the Observatoire published in 
December 1996. But the dissolution of the National Assembly in Spring 
1997 resulted in a change of majority. Lionel Jospin, the new left-wing 
Premier Minister committed his government to this reform and decided to 
revise the constitution accordingly. The revision was meant to prevent any 
further rejection of parity laws by the Constitutional Council. It had also a 
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high symbolic value. In the republican ideology, the Constitution epitomizes 
both the social contract: it sets the fundamental rules according to the 
people’s choice, and the revolutionary spirit: the Constitution may be 
changed as the course of history may be changed, but not easily, and only for 
major purposes. It is symptomatic of a period of doubt about French 
citizenship that the Constitution has been revised twelve times since 1992 
(and only five time between 1948 and 1992). Anyway, two amendments 
were adopted in July 1999 by the National Assembly and the Senate. A 
paragraph has been added in article 3 dealing with sovereignty: “the law 
favours the equal access of women and men to political mandates and 
functions” while article 4 now states that the political parties contribute to 
the implementation of this principle. These changes are far below the parity 
movement’s expectations. So was the law adopted in June 2000. Basically, 
equal numbers of male and female candidates are required only for election 
with proportional representations in France either with alternation (European 
elections), or with equal numbers required for each group of six candidates 
(Regional and Municipal). There are some restrictions, the most important 
being for the Municipal elections in cities with less than 3500 inhabitant 
where the electoral system is not proportionally representative and for part 
of the Senatorial elections. No rule applies for the Presidential election. As 
for the National Assembly, there are only financial incentives: half of the 
subsidy for a party may be reduced according to the excess of male over 
female candidates. Supporters of the parity movements are all the more 
disappointed in that the law does make a difference where parity applies: the 
proportion of female MPs in the cities where the law applies doubled in 
2001.  
Even anti-parity supporters cannot deny that the constitutional change and 
the 2000 law constitute a success for the feminist movement. The equality of 
representation of men and women is now recognized as desirable, even if 
parity itself is far from being imposed. In many areas, as Amy Mazur shows 
it in the preceding chapter of this book dedicated to women’s issues, the 
European Union is quite efficient at gendering the French legal and social 
system. But the French tendency to confuse uniformity and equality persists 
at the core of the belief system, the political level. 
 
France turning into a multi-level democracy ?  
 
The learning of abstract citizenship was made possible by the simultaneous 
building of the nation, whose warmth and strength made up, in the long 
term, both for the wrench from distinctive identities and the holding of civic 
duties (Nora 1984-1990). Looking today in depth into the imagination of 
French citizens, you can see how the power of the nation is exchanged 
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against the complete helplessness of the atomistic individual citizen. The 
identification with their nation is made reality by a feeling of common 
possession, of collective inheritance of the soil of France. It is fuelled by the 
memories of the dead, of the ancestors who fought, together or against each 
other, to make the country what it is now. (Duchesne 1997) The nation is 
imagined as embodying a common will, in a way which rules out any kind 
of plurality. Renan’s well known phrase, the nation as “daily plebiscite”, is a 
good example of the way anonymity is given distinctive identity in the 
imagination of a will inherited from ancestors. This gives the nation an 
exclusiveness in the affections and solidarities of the citizens, which reflects 
the centralisation of the French political system and the lack of pluralism, of 
check and balances, in the distribution of power. This exclusiveness was 
only challenged in a few regions, Brittany, the Basque Country and Corsica, 
where the region competes against the nation for these affections.  
Yet in the last decade, the French political system has been challenged from 
below and above, by decentralisation, the Europeanisation of the State and 
more generally speaking, the impact of globalisation (see Le Galès and 
Smith’s chapters in this book) Does this redistribution of power affect the 
national exclusiveness of French citizens’ identification? Does the multi-
level governance meet with a response in French citizens’ alliances and 
slowly begin to turn into a multi-level democracy? (Schild 2001)  
As a first remark, let’s state that national pride, the most common measure 
of national identification, has not decreased in the last ten years. On the 
contrary: in France as in most European countries, the proportion of people 
who declare themselves proud of their country tend to increase, the French 
being rather under the European mean (less than 40% percent of respondents 
saying that they are very proud). Obviously, survey questions are poor 
measures of in-depth feelings of self like identifications. Many social 
scientists prefer other methods of inferring attitudes – in-depth qualitative 
interviews or social practice. The regular decrease of turnout in general 
elections, and especially in the first ballot of the 2002 presidential election, 
could for instance be interpreted as a contradictory indicator of a weakened 
national identification. 
What about Europe then? Should the low level of turnout June 2004 (42%) 
be seen as an indicator of a persistent difficulty for French people to accept 
the European level as legitimate ? For a long time, attitudes towards Europe 
have been considered in France, as in most European countries, as mere 
opinions, as attitudes towards a remote object, superficial, something that 
could not properly be analysed as an identity (Duchesne & Frognier 1995). 
After the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, many observers expected the 
continuation of European integration and the institutionalisation of a 
European citizenship to result in the growth of more deeply grounded 
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feelings towards Europe – mainly negative feelings because of the strength 
of the potentially competitive national identification (Mayer 1996).  
Actually, general attitudes towards the EU continue to be largely positive. In 
a recent survey, the French Electoral Panel 2002, hardly 5% of the 
interviewees considered that France belonging to the EU was a bad thing. 
And this, even though most of them answered at the same time that they fear 
European Union will result in a deterioration of the social welfare system 
and an increase in immigration. Interestingly, positive attitudes towards the 
EU are so widespread that it makes more sense to search for an explanation 
of the resistance to Europe than of acceptance (Belot & Cautrès 2004). This 
is confirmed by the way French people have easily got accustomed to the 
Euro. Even if, like all other people in the Euro zone, they have complained 
about the increase in prices that was hidden by the change of currency. All 
fears that people might be unable to cope with the new range of values or 
that they would feel deprived of some part of their identity have quickly 
vanished. 
Explaining this general acceptance of Europe without a corresponding 
weakening of national identification could be as follows. Instead of giving 
rise to a competing identification, attitudes about Europe seem to have easily 
fitted into a pattern of identifications based on the national level. The 
identification with one’s nation is a process of building one’s abstract 
loyalty. Rather than introducing a new kind of commitment between citizens 
and their polity, Europe seems to be one step further in this process that 
Inglehart has described as a cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1977). When 
French people imagine the work in progress that is the European Union, 
most of them figure it out as the replication, at another time and on a 
different scale, of the process of nation building that France has gone 
through before. That is, a process of homogenisation. Hence they basically 
do not experience European belonging as a threat to French allegiance, as 
long as their politicians do not present it in that way. In France – and 
contrary to what happens in the British Isles – national and European are 
less competitive than cumulative. Instead of being a handicap for the 
development of European identification, strong national feelings open the 
way in a process of growing abstraction of the political community 
(Duchesne & Frognier 2002). But the nature of the link between the citizen 
and the polity remains the same, he/she becomes part of the quest for a 
European general will. Something very different from the kind of 
relationship you would expect in a multi-level democracy.  
What about the regional level? The new regional assemblies and executives 
have long been in search of legitimacy and tried to get any possible evidence 
for it. For two decades now, the Observatoire Régional du Politique a public 
survey institute funded by the regions, has carried out large opinion polls 
and looked for any sign of increasing identification of the French with their 
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regions, with little success. The desire for greater proximity between citizens 
and their rulers seems to clash with a fear that more competences given to 
the regions would result in the disengagement of the State. Anyway, the last 
regional elections have been a surprise. First because of the (relatively) low 
level of abstention: more than 62% voted, which breaks with the persistent 
decrease of turnout since 1986. Secondly, because of the results: in all 
regions but one the opposition won the majority. This has been widely 
interpreted as a negative verdict from the voters against the government. It is 
always very risky to attribute a will to the electorate; similar votes may have 
very different motives and most voters find it difficult to really explain their 
choice anyway. However, another interpretation of the dramatic victory of 
left-wing parties is the growing capacity of French people to accept or 
favour some sharing of power. This could be compared with the different 
experiences of cohabitation (these situations where the French President is 
in political opposition with the majority of the National Assemble), 
originally analysed by French observers as consequences of irrational 
electoral behaviour, but subsequently found to be appreciated by public 
opinion. As well as a sanction against the government, last Spring regional 
elections could then be seen as a consequence of a growing acceptance of 
institutional pluralism, something that is supposed to be rather alien to 
French political culture (Safran 2002). 
This is a vexed question, but matters of identification are complicated ones 
and it is difficult to give evidence for it. The point here is that the strength 
and abstraction of the French national community makes the development of 
European identification easier. It appears as a “natural” extension of the 
process of homogenisation that former French regions went through in the 
Nineteenth century. But this kind of identification is not the kind of 
relationship between a citizen and the polity that would be expected in a 
multi-level governance, where there is no supposition of general will behind 
the complexity of the decision making process. Nevertheless, some other 
elements indicate that French people may get slowly accustomed to some 
kind of pluralism of power. This may be a sign of a deeper change in French 
citizenship.  
 
Laicity at school: the return of the repressed.  
“Something disturbing is happening in France. It started with a seemingly 
innocuous debate about Muslim schoolgirls’ head scarves, yet it got 
transmogrified into a veritable Kulturkampf about the nature of public space 
in the French Republic” (Herald Tribune 5/02/04) How come France made 
such a fuss over ten Muslim schoolgirls a year refusing to get rid of their 
headscarves? This is what most countries, especially Britain and the States, 
wondered about France in the last couple of years. Indeed, when looking at 
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the facts, it is difficult to understand why French people have been so 
fiercely committed in the headscarf affair. Let us briefly recall what 
happened. 
In 1989, three Muslim schoolgirls were expelled from their school because 
they refused to give up their headscarves when asked to by the teachers, who 
considered that this was an offence to school neutrality in religious matters. 
Their parents went to appeal and finally Lionel Jospin referred to the 
Conseil d’État. The decision was that expressing one’s belief through any 
piece of clothing was no breach of laicity as long as it was not meant to 
convert others to one’s religion and did not affect the teaching. For five 
years, similar cases occurred, calling into question what should be 
considered as proselytism – and more precisely, if a headscarf, and what 
kind of headscarf, should be considered as such. In 1994, Francois Bayrou, 
Minister of Education, published a circular and ordered schools to forbid 
any form of religious ostentation. Things went on. According to Luc Ferry, 
Minister of Education between 2002 and 2004, there were about thousand 
five hundreds girls every year wearing headscarf at school, of whom about a 
hundred went to mediation which failed to resolve matters in about ten 
cases. 
In 2002, in Lyon, teachers went to strike because the local education 
authority refused to punish two schoolgirls who were wearing a bandana at 
school by way of a headscarf. The debate became intense. A first manifesto 
in favour of a law on laicity at school was signed by about two thousand 
intellectuals. Jean-Louis Debré, chair of the National Assembly, set up a 
parliamentary mission “to think about religious signs at school”. Jacques 
Chirac then asked Bernard Stasi, ombudsman of the Republic, to chair a 
committee of twenty experts and give a report on the contemporary demand 
for laicity. While the parliamentary mission kept the focus on laicity at 
school, the wider scope of investigation of the Stasi committee, whose 
hearings got a large audience, contributed to an impression of creeping 
islamicization of French society. The expulsion from their school, in 
Aubervilliers, of two sisters, Alma and Lila, got widely publicised. By this 
time, Jacques Chirac had let it be known that he would address the nation in 
December, when the conclusions of the Stasi Committee would be 
published, and make a decision then.  
The discussion was lively and quite confused. Every group, every political 
or religious affiliations were divided between those pro- and anti a law 
prohibiting the headscarf. Differences of opinion where highlighted, 
sometimes in inconsistent combinations. At the forefront was obviously a 
variable tolerance of foreigners. 9/11, as well as more than two decades of 
Front National’s campaigning, carried great weight in the debate. A second 
important line of differentiation was the belief (or not) in the persistent 
efficiency of the republican integration model: are French schools still 
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capable of making citizens? Since the mid 80s, civic education had been 
reintroduced in primary schools, and the curriculum constantly refined and 
strengthened by every government, left or right. In 1999, “civic, legal and 
social education” was set up in secondary schools as well. The concept of 
citizenship taught at school is quite traditional and meant to be straight in 
the republican tradition: a citizen should be independent of his/her 
distinctive affiliations and commit him/herself into the public sphere in 
rising above his/her private interests. In a social context of cultural diversity 
and relative values, civic education claims the existence of common values, 
shared by all French citizens and embodied in the Republic. A third and very 
confusing aspect of the debate was the women’s liberation point of view. 
For French feminists, the headscarf was an obvious sign of women’s 
alienation. Shortly before Chirac’s decision, the magazine Elle circulated a 
petition asking the President to adopt a law against the headscarf considered 
“a visible symbol of the submission of women in places where the State has 
to be the guarantor of a strict equality between genders” (Elle, 9/12/03). In 
polls, opinion was favourable to a law: 55% in October, 53% in November, 
57% in December, according to the survey institute CSA. 
The report of the Stasi committee was made public on the 11
th
 of October 
2003. It strongly reaffirmed laicity as a principle of French public service, 
arguing that it should be implemented by public servants and respected by 
users. At the same time, it emphasized the necessity for more respect for 
religious diversity in France. It suggested the adoption of a law on laicity 
including articles in school prohibiting clothes and sign of religious or 
political affiliation. Large crosses, veil and kippa should be considered as 
such. It also suggested a couple of measures to encourage respect for 
religious diversity, including turning the two religious festivals Yom Kippur 
and Aid-el-Kebir into bank holidays. This later point gave rise to fierce 
opposition in the media. 
A week later, Jacques Chirac declared himself in favour of a law prohibiting 
overt religious signs at school. In a passionate speech remembering the 
history and principles of the French Republic, he endorsed most of the 
conclusions of the Stasi Committee, apart from the point concerning new 
bank holidays, but putting the emphasis on the school question. Indeed, 
instead of a broad and encompassing law on laicity, the government 
prepared and presented on the 7
th
 of January 2004 a proposed law with three 
articles and a long preceding statement of motivation. Basically, the 
proposition prohibited obvious religious signs at school. These signs were 
defined as signs or pieces of clothing whose wearing makes one’s religious 
affiliation immediately recognised. Compared to the existing rules, the law 
is giving schools the means to prohibit not only headscarves but even 
bandanas, if they were to adopt rules and regulations accordingly. 
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Again, the debate about the adoption of the law was complicated, and parties 
were divided about it. Quite a few demonstrations occurred. But the 
government pushed it through fast. By the third of March, the law had been 
adopted without major change by the two Assemblies and by mid-May, the 
implementation circular had been adopted by the High Council of 
Education. The law came into force in September, in a tense atmosphere as 
two French journalists were taken hostage and their kidnapper asked the 
government to cancel the law. Nevertheless, the law seemed to be generally 
accepted as no incident occurred when the children got back to school. 
What does this all mean? Why did so many people mobilize for a law that 
really concerns a couple of schoolgirls? Obviously, because the principles at 
stake were felt to be of major importance. Indeed, because laicity and school 
happen to be two of the most emblematic points of tension and conflict in 
the French pattern of ideologies. We have seen how French people invented 
laicity because of the complete domination of the Catholic Church in the 
Kingdom of France. After a century of battle between Republicans and 
Catholics in and about schools, the so called neutrality of the French 
education system remains a very sensitive aspect of French national identity. 
Two decades ago, the then new socialist government dramatically failed to 
reform public financial support to Catholic private schools. Today, laicity is 
at stake in the headscarf affair. It reactivated important features of the 
French pattern of ideologies: the recurrent implication of Catholic 
domination over French society, the difficulty in understanding pluralism 
and the infinite quest for concrete, flesh and blood individualism. Public 
opinion reacts massively when such questions are at stake while French 
intellectuals keep trying to assert French distinctive identity in universalistic 
terms - indeed quite a challenge (Jennings 2000). Two enemies are pointed 
at  in this quest: (selfish) individualism and communitarianism.  
Two elements were particularly confusing in the headscarf affair. Firstly, the 
way the question of laicity, which has been developed because of the 
domination of the Catholic Church, was raised again and applied without 
change to a minority religion. This practice indeed allowed people to suspect 
that a persistence of Catholic domination over French society was hidden 
behind the alleged defence of State neutrality. Jacques Chirac recently spoke 
of “our Jewish or Muslim countrymen, or most simply sometimes French 
people” in terms reminiscent of an unfortunate declaration of Raymond 
Barre, former Premier Minister, after an anti-Semitic attack in the rue des 
Rosiers in Paris (Jacques Chirac, televised interview, 14/07/04). This 
manifests the tendency to mix up French people with people from non-
Jewish and non-Muslim religion. This obviously gives foreign observers 
good reasons for suspecting that the law against the headscarf is mainly 
inspired by xenophobia. It is much more complicated than that. 
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An other element that has to be taken into account is the reluctance of 
French people to think that religious belief may be a matter of choice. 
Again, because of the long term domination of the Catholic Church in 
French society, religious practice is considered a conventional behaviour, a 
way people conform to authority. The statistical relationship between 
Church attendance and conservative political orientation has long been 
interpreted as a confirmation of religious alienation (Michelat & Simon 
1977) and of the implausibility of freedom of choice in religious matters 
(Donegani 1993). And yet, sociologists demonstrated early on that the 
decision made by French schoolgirls to wear the headscarf was mostly their  
own (Gaspard & Khosrokhavar 1995). At best, people could believe that 
young Muslim girls could find in the headscarf a way to gain some freedom 
and, for instance, to get family permission to go to University (Venel 1999). 
The incredulous comments on Alma and Lila’s case was a good example of 
that. The two schoolgirls have a Jewish atheist father and a mother who is 
Kabylian Catholic. They were expelled from school because they refused to 
renounce their headscarf. The press could hardly believe that this was 
anything other than a teenage fancy manipulated by an activist father (Levy 
& Levy 2004). The way the report of the Stasi committee interpreted the 
wearing of the headscarf as a sign of “serious worsening of the situation of 
young women” is at odds with the general belief that nobody could ever 
choose to do such a thing of their own will. Again, French national identity 
is the  result of an unfinished rebellion against Catholic domination that left 




Far from being a consensual and homogeneous ideology, French national 
identity is a strong pattern of tensions and ambivalences hidden by a 
recurrent and loud claim to the republican tradition. Recent developments 
have shaken up the fragile balance that seemed to have been found after the 
Second World War. Massive immigration, women’s liberation, European 
integration, globalisation: the last decade has been full of major changes in 
French political citizenship. Most of them are not specific to France. But the 
strong tension in French political culture between an atomistic and abstract 
concept of the individual citizen and a cohesive and distinctive national 
identity seemed to leave only a little space for change. The difficult 
adaptation of French citizenship to globalisation has been dramatically made 
visible on the 21
st
 of April 2002. The four case studies presented in this 
chapter give an insight into the difficulty on adapting the French pattern of 
ideologies. The resistance is all the more strong when the change concerns 
the core of the republican tradition, established as a compromise: the 
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openness and universalism of the political community, the existence of a 
general will and the role of schools in the making of the citizens. Change is 
going on despite this resistance and a different compromise will renew from 
the inside the old republican outfit .  
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